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harmonia which Aristotle overlooks, in which a harmonia is 
something cau sal ly dependent on but distinct fromaa certain 
disposition of materials, e.g. a melody is distinct from the 
strings which produce it, and equally from the tuning of the 
strings, though wi th ou t strings there could be no tuning, and 
without tuni ng no melody. The word has this sense especially 
in mu si c al contexts, meaning variously 'scale', 'mode' or 
g e nera lly 'music' (v. LSJ). Given, then , that the el ements 
in question are those which compose the human body , hot , cold, 
etc. (which are pr esum ab ly thought of as different kinds of 
stuff) , there app ear to be four po ssible interpretations of 
the thesis that the soul is a har mon i a of these elem ents : 
a) The soul is ide nti cal with the � atio or fo rmul a 
according to whtch the elem en ts are combined to form th e 
living man; 
b) Th e soul is i denti cal with th e mixture or combina­
tion of those · el em en ts according to th at formula; 
c) Th e soul i s some entity produced by the combination 
of those elements according to that formula, but ·distinct. 
alike from them and from· the formula itself; 
d) The soul is identical with a s tate of the bodily 
elements, viz. the state of being combined according to 
that formula. 
It mi ght be objected at this point that the third altern a­
tive is illusory, since even where the harmo nia is a scale or 
me lo dy it must be considered identical with a mixture of elements. 
This seems implausible on the assumption that the elements in 
q ues t io n are s trin gs or other physical objects which compose the 
inst ru me n t which produces the music, but this assumption is mis­
taken. Just as the elements of a physical constitution, e.g. 
the living human body, are the hot, the cold and so on, so the 
e lem ents of a piece of music are the high and the low, which 
are conceived of as being mixed together in th e proper propor­
ti ons to gi ve the right notes, e ith er in t he sense th at each 
note is tho ught of as consisting of so much of the high mixed 
with so much of the low, or in the sense that each mode or 
scale is produced by combining so �any high notes in fixed 
ratios with so many low notes. The ele men ts , therefore, out 
of which a musi cal harmonia is formed are themselves musical 
entities, the high and the low, and not the physical objects 
which produce the sounds. This view of the elements of a 
musical harmonia is cl ea rly expressed for instance in the 
pseudo-Aristotelean tr e ati se De Mundo, 396b 7f f. (DK 22 B 10): 
'Mu s ic makes a si ngle harmonia-out of different sounds by mix-
ing together high and low, long and short notes '. On this 
view of a mus ical harmonia, then, the harmonia cannot be 
separated from it s e lem ent s , and so this view do e s not admit 
the third interpretation o f  the soul -h armon i a as an indepen-
dent alternative to the first two. 
But while thi s view of the nature of mu sic al harmonia 
appears to be th e standard viaw of musical theory, and give� 
the most exact parallel to 0th.er kinds of harmonia, e.g. the 
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formation of physical substances out of the elements, or the 
production of a certain temperature by mixing the hot and the 
cold, it is not the view of musical harmonia which Simmias 
uses to illustrate his thesis that the soul is a harmonia. 
For Simmias' presentation of his thesis involves positing a 
parallelism between two relations, of each of which the terms 
are a) a physical object and b) a non-physical entity causal­
ly dependent on that object. Thus corresponding to the incorpor­
eal soul we have the musical harmonia, which is 'invisible and 
incorporeal and all-beautiful and divine' (85e 5-6), while 
corresponding to the physical body we have not the high and 
the low but the physical strings and pegs of the lyre, which 
can be broken apart and left lying around after.the harmonia 
has vanished. It is true that Sirn.mias slightly distorts the 
parallel when he says (85b 5-c 1) that the soul is a harmonia 
of the hot, cold, etc . ,  in the bo�y, since a more exact parallel 
to the strings etc., of the lyre would seem to be provided by 
the limbs and ·organs of the body than by their microsc opic 
elements. But the essential point is to contrast the incor­
poreal product with its physical cause, and in order to make 
this contrast it is unnecessary for Simmias clearly to distin­
guish the physical macroscopic parts of the body from their 
own elements, which are no doubt conceived of as minute but 
equally corporeal parts. The relation of musical harmonia to 
its elements which Simmias is using cannot therefore be th at 
between a scale or tune and the musical elements of high and 
low etc., but must be that between a musical instrument and 
some non-physical entity produced by a certain state of the 
instrument. 
This, then, enables us immediately to eliminate the 
second of our four sugge s ted interpretations of the soul­
harrnonia thesis, viz. that the soul is identical with the 
mixture or,combination of the bodily elements according to 
a certaid ratid or formula. For it would be clearly absurd 
to make a sharp contrast between the physical elements and 
the non-physical harmonia if the latter just was identical 
with the elements in a certain arrangement. One might as 
sensibly contrast the invisible, in corporeal plum-pudding 
with the gross, earthy suet, raisins, flour etc. which com­
pose it. This still leaves us with three al ternative s , that 
the relation of the soul to the body is a) that of the ratio 
of the tuned strings to the strings themselves, or b) that 
of the music produced by the instrument to the instrument 
itself, or c) that of the state of being in tune to the 
strings. 
There seems no conclusive evidence from the dialogue 
which alternative Plato had in mind, or indeed whether he had 
clearly distinguished the three. Various phrases give some 
hints, but these are conf licting and inconclusive. Thus for 
instance the description of musical harmonia as 'all-beautiful 
and divine' might seem most readily applicable to the music 
produced by the instrument; but when we reflect that the speak­
er is a pupil of the Pythagorean Philolaos, and might therefore 
3 
be expe c ted to have a lively reverenc e  for numbers as the sourc e  
o f  all things , this argument seems t o  have little force as 
between alternatives a ) and b ) . Rather stronger is the argument 
from Simmias' statement at 92d 2 that the s oul-harmonia doctrine 
is a c cepted by most pe ople; surely, it may be argued, this indi c ­
ates that the soul i s  something distin ct from a mathematical 
r at io , since such an obscure theory can never have been held by 
the majority of ordinary people. On the other h and , the view 
that the soul is something non-physi c al, which is yet dependent 
on a certain state of the body, so that when that state is 
disrupted the soul is dissipated , migh t seem to be a be lie f 
quite congenial to common sense. But ag ainst this we have the 
c omparison of the soul at 86c 6-7 to 'harmoniai in sounds and 
in all the works of the craftsmen'. 'All the w6rks of the 
c raftsmen ' must include statuary and painting , and probably 
carpentry and house-building as well. Where, in the cases of 
the produ c ts of these arts , are we to lilok for the non -physi c al 
product of the physi c al elements? Surely in the harmony or 
proportion of the c onstituent parts , as exemplified by dif ferent 
amounts of differently-coloured paints , or by the relation s 
between the dimensions of various parts of a statue ,or a pj.ece 
of furniture . It would be too fantastic to suggest that to ·· · 
every wel l -made table there corresponds a non - phy si c al entity 
whic h is related to the dispositions of its parts as the non ­
phys i c al soul is to the disposit ion of the bodily elements. 
This c omparison , then, tends in the opposite dire c tion from 
the remark at 92d 2 that most people accept the soul -harmonia 
thesis. Further difficulty is cre ated by th e description of 
the soul at 86b 9 as a mixture (krasis) of the bodily elements. 
The word krasis , which is regularl y used as a synonym for 
harmonia (e.g. Ar . De An. 408a 30-31 ), c ommonly o c c urs, like 
the English 'mixture' in contexts whi c h  leave it open whether 
the word refers to the state of being mixed together or to 
the c ompound of e lements which are mix ed up. We have seen 
that the second a lternative is cle arly una c c eptable, but what 
about the first? Can Plato me an that the soul is identic al 
neither with a ratio nor with any produ c t of a rat1o, but 
rather with a certain state of the body, viz.the stat� in 
which the elements of the body are in a certain ratio? While 
on the one hand this would give a fair ac c ount of the c ompari­
son of the soul with works of art, on the other hand it fits 
rather 111 with the sharp contrast between the invisible , div­
ine music al harmonia and the physical in s trument , while again 
it might well seem very dubious that most people believe that 
the soul is nothing other than a bodily state. There appear , 
then, to be hints in the text of the di alogue of support for 
all three possible interpret ations of the soul-harmo�ia thesis, 
a) t hat the soul is identical with a ratio of the bod i ly ele­
ments, b) that it is identical with some non-physi c al product 
of that rat io and c) that it is identi cal with the state of 
being in that ratio. It might thus appear that Plato has 
failed to distinguish these alternatives ; before leaving this 
ques tion , however, we should look at some evidence from other 
sour c es, to see whether they throw any ligh t on Plato's mean­
ing. 
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be natural to assume that it was current in the Pythagorean 
circle to which they belonged. Though they are described as 
pupils of Philolaos ( 6ld-e; D.L. viii, 46), the theory itself 
is not ascribed to him by any writer earlier than Macrobius 
(4-5 cent. A.D. ) , who says that Pythagoras and Philolaos held 
that the soul is a harmonia (DK 44 A 23). It is not clear how 
much reliance can be put on this testimony, since there is 
obviously a possibility that it may derive ultimately from 
this very passage of the Phaedo. But whatever may be the 
truth about that, it is highly unlikely that Philolass' view 
of the soul can be reconciled with the harmonia theory as 
expounded by Simmias. For at 6la-62b it is implied that 
Philolaos taught that suicide was wrong on the ground that 
the soul is put by the gods in the body as a prison for a 
set time, and must not seek to escape before the time of 
its release, but that a philosopher will �elcome death, pre� 
sumably because his soul will have a better existence in 
separation from the body. This is supported by a quotation 
from Philolaos given by Clement of Alexandria (DK 44 B 14) 
'the soul is yoked to the body and as it were buried in this 
tomb as a punishment'. The conclusion from this i� plain, 
that unlike his pupils who take part in the dialogue, Philo­
laos believed that the soul exists independently of the body. 
It is not impossible that he may have held some version of 
the theory, in which the soul was a non-physical entity whose 
association with the body depended on the maintainance of the 
proper bodily ratio, but the divergence from the view expres­
sed by Simmias is so great that it is obviously fruitless to 
attempt to interpret the latter in such a way as to assimilate 
it to some conjectural reconstruction of Philolaos' view. 
I conclude, then, that not only is there no evidence that 
the soul-harmonia thesis definitely identifies the soul either 
with a ratio of its elements or with the state of being in that 
ratio or with some entity dependent on the possession of that 
ratio, but that we can best account for what is said in the 
dialogue on the assumption that Plato did not clearly distin­
guish the three possibilities. Nor is this particularly sur­
prising; for in the first place the distinction is a very fine 
one between the soul's actually being a ratio and its being 
the state of having one's elements in a ratio, since in either 
case having a soul will be identical with having one's elements 
in a ratio. It is possible.to be alear about the distinction 
only if one clearly distinghishes purely mathematical entities 
such as numbers from states of phy�ical objects which can be 
described in mathematical terms. Failure to make this distinc­
tion was the ground of one of Aristotle's criticisms of the 
Pythagoreans (Met. A8, 989b29-990a32), while we have seen that 
the presentation of the thesis by Simmias in the dialogue is 
similarly unclear. While the distinction between the soul as 
a ratio and as an entity supervening on the possession of a 
ratio is more obvious, Aristotle's example of health which we 
have already noticed indicates that that distinction too may 
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be easy to overlook. In c ons id e r i n g Pl ato's arguments ag ainst 
the thesis we shall therefore have to regard them as concerned 
with a thesis which contains in an undifferentiated form the 
thr•ee alternative senses which we have considered. 
Socrates' first argument against the thesis requires little 
comment. He points out that it is inconsistent with the doctrine, 
which was earlier accepted, that all knowledge is in fact recol­
lection of what the soul had learnt in a previous existence when 
it was not ass oci a t e d with the body. No harmonia can exist unless 
the elements of which it is a harmonia are already in existence, 
and hence if the soul is a harmonia of the bodily elements it 
cannot have h ad a previous non- b odily existence (9le-92e). This 
argument is valid against any interpretation of the harmonia 
thesis; obviously a b odily state cannot exist unless some body 
exists of which it is the st ate, and equally obviously a non­
physical e ntity causally dependent on a ratio of bodily elements 
cannot exist before those elements have been combined in that 
ratio. A defender of the thesis might� however, argue that it 
is not cogent against the identification of the soul with the 
mathematical ratio itself. For a ratio, being a timeless mathe­
matical entity, cannot itself be said to come into existence 
whenever it is embodied in some particular m aterial. Since it 
exists equally at all time, it may truly be said to have existed 
before a certain body came into being, and hence the argument 
from recollection does not refute this version of the thesis. 
This defence is not, however, adopted by Simmias, who agrees 
that his thesis is incon s istent with the doctrine that all 
knowledge is recollection. Nor is it difficult to see why. 
For it is possible to de fend the soul-harmonia against this 
argument on ly at the cost of making it a ·universal; if a certain 
set of elements comb ine in the ratio 3/4, then indeed that ratio 
existed before the combination of the elements, but the thing 
tha.t existed was the ratio 3/4, i.e., the very same ratio which 
is exempllf:ied whenever three units are related to four units. 
Thus anyone who held this t heory would have to admit that it was 
logically possible for many things to have the same soul, includ­
ing things which would generally be reckoned inanimate, e.g., 
geometrical diagrams, since there is no reason why the same ratio 
which is embodied in a particular human being and is his soul 
might not also hold. between certain lines and angles. It is not, 
of course, impossible that anyone may have believed something lik;e 
this; it might, for instance, provide a theory to account for 
transmigration. Empedocles would on this view have been a bush 
and a fish because one and the same ratio was embodied in bush, 
fish and Empedocles, i.e., they all had the same soul. Simmias, 
however, will have none of this; if his version of the theory is 
interpreted as making the soul a mathematic al entity, it must be 
such an entity individuated by being embodied in these bodily 
elements. As such it clearly c annot exist independently of the 
elements by reference to which it is individuated, any more than 
Socrates' height can exist independently of Socrat es , though in 
the sense in which Socrates' height is a univ e r s al , say four 
cubits, that length may be said always to have existed, or rather 
never to have come into �xistence, whether or not Socrates exists. 
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This way of looking at the soul-harmonia has the advantage of 
preserving as a necessary truth that different persons have 
numerically different souls, whereas on the other interpreta­
tion two contemporaneous persons might discover as the result 
of physiological investigation that they had the same soul. 
It leaves the thesis open, however, to attack on the grounds 
of inconsistency with the doctrine of knowledge as recollec­
tion; whether one considers it ad�quately refuted on those 
grounds Will naturally depend on the strength of one's convic­
tion in the soul's pre-existence. 
The remaining arguments are more problematical, in that 
commentators have disagreed not so much as to their conclusive­
ness, but rather on the question of how many arguments Socrates 
employs, and just what these arguments are .. Like Miss Hicken 
in C.Q. 1954, pp. 16-22 and Bluck in his commentary, I discern 
two-arguments, as opposed, for instance, to the four specffied 
by Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle's De An� A4. 
These arguments are not, however, presented consecutively; at 
92e4-93al0 Socrates gives a set of premisses (A) which are not 
immediately used in the argument. Instead, at :93a11�12 he be­
gins a new argument by formulating a principle which ·1.s to ·some .. 
extent independent of the set .of premisses A. This argument 
continues to its conclusion at 9�al2-b2; for convenience this 
whole argument may be called B. Then at 94b4 Socrates returns 
to the set of premisses A, which he uses to construct the se­
cond argument, which we may call Al, whose conclusion is reached 
at 95a2. While I shall deal first with argument B, it is 
necessary first to look at premisses A, in order to determine 
the relation they have to the principle with �hich Socrates · 
begins B.2 
A begins with the acceptance by Simmias of the proposition 
that the qualities of a harmonia are determined by those of its 
elements (92e4G93a2; let this be labelled al). We then have 
three succesive applications of this principle, first to all 
activities and passivities of the harmonia (93a4-5; al.l) and 
then to a particular activity and some particular passivities 
which are ruled out by the principle. In virtue of the prin­
ciple it is impossible for a harmonia to lead or control its 
elements, but it must rather be controlled by them (93a6-7; 
al.11), and it is impossible for it to be affected in any way 
contrary to that which -its elements determine ( 93a8-9; al.12). 
ry is al.11 and al.12 which provide the premisses for argument 
A . At 93all-12 we have the principle which marks the begin­
ning of argument B: 'Well, now, doesn't every harmonia have to 
be the kind of harmonia which corresponds to the way that it is 
attuned (or arranged)1 (bl). It is not easy to find a transla­
tion which is both exact and ·comprehensible but the next sen­
tence, giving an application of the principle, makes fairly 
clear what is meant; if a Harmonia is more attuned, then it is 
more (of) a harmonia, and if it is less attuned it is less (of) 
1 The grounds for rejecting Philoponus' interpretation, which 
is followed, not without incoherence, by Archer-Hind and Hackforth, 
are cogently stated by Miss Hicken, pp. 17-8. 
2 See Appendix 
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a�arornmia (93al4-b2; bl.l ) . The sense of bl itself can then 
best be expressed formally , as follows, that where 1¢1 stands 
for an adjective which can apply toaaharmonia, and where '¢ly' 
is the adverb formed from'¢', then for all x, if x is a harmon-
ia) if x is attuned or arranged ¢ly, x is a 95 harmonia. While 
this cer·tainly goes beyond-anything that is said in A, it seems 
an extremeview of Miss Hicken that S ocrates here begins 'an 
entirely new set of admissions'; rather we might say that this 
'formal' account of the dependenc e of the harmonia on what gives 
rise to it is tt least suggested by what haSbeensaid in A. The 
difference is that whereas there we were concerned with the depen­
dence of the harmonia,on the elements, now we are concerned with 
its dependence on the state or process of being arranged er attuned. 
Argument B proc eeds by way of two, further premisses, b2, 
that no soul is more or less (of) a soul than any other (93b4-7) 
and b3, that a good soul is in tune and a bad soul out of tune 
(93b8-cl0). Neither of these premisses is felt to require any 
justification or explanation; the sense of the latter is clearly 
that the good man is not a prey to the conflicting desires and 
impulses which are the mark of the bad man, but has all his 
wants properly under control with a view to the attainment of the 
right ends. We now come to one of the most problematical pas­
sages in the argument: at 93dl-5 Socrates says that premiss 
b2 is the same as the propos it ion (b2.l) that no harmonia is 
more or less ( of ) a harmonia than any other, and Simrnias agrees. 
Of course b2 is not as it stands equivalent to this, and the 
question is what addit ional assumptions Plato must have used in 
order to produce what he considered a va lid equivalence. Clear­
ly we cannot arrive at such an equivalence simply by making the 
most obvious assumption , viz. the assumption under examination 
in this argument, that the soul is a harmonia, since taken 
together with b2 that would still allowth at some harmoniai 
might be more or less h armoniai than others. But did Plato see 
that? I am inclined to think that he did not , but rather assum­
ing that the' soul is a harmonia, took this to mean that every­
thing which is true of soul is also true of harmonia (using 
these terms in the unquantified style familiar from Aristotle). 
In effect this is to confuse implication with equivalence, which 
seems a not unlikely error for Plato to commit at this stage in 
hi s philosophical development, since it is only in the Sophist 
that he clearly distinguishes predication from identity. 
The standard modern interpretation of this sente nce , adopted 
by Archer-Hind, Bluck, Hackforth and Miss Hicken (but not by 
Burn et ) differs from the above in taking So c rates to be assert­
ing not a general proposition about all harmoniai, but a specific 
proposition about the sort of harmoniai, that souls are, viz. 
that no soul-harmonia is more or less of a harmonia than any 
other. As this requires an a dmittedly unnatural reading of the 
text as it stands, many s cholars (see Hackforth's note, p. 116) 
have suggested removing the word harmonias from d4, thus making 
the sentence read 'And this (namely the admission that no soul 
is more or less (of) a soul than any other) is the admission 
that no fuoul) is more or less a h armoni a than any other.' But 
since this emend ation lacks any manu script authorit y , and des­
troys what looks like a very emphatic and deliberate parallelismm 
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of sentence construction, it is worth asking whether there are 
cogent grounds either for emending the text, or for reading the 
received text in other than its natural sense. The strangest 
ground appears to be that urged e.g. by Miss Hicken, that 
since the argument is to depend on the assumption that some 
harmoniai (in particular, goodness) admit of degrees, it would 
be flatly inconsistent if Plato also used the assumption that 
no harmonia admits of degrees. I doubt the cogency of this 
argument, which seems to me to depend on a confusion· over the 
notion of 'degrees of attunement'. For the thesis that some 
harmoniai (e.g. goodness) admit or degrees comes to this, that 
! some things, e.g. the parts of the soul, may be so arranged as 
to approximate more or less closely to s£me norm which represents 
the perfect arrangement of those things. B�t that is in no way 
in compatible with the thesis which I take Plato to be asserting 
at 93dl-5, viz. that if what a thing is is a harmonia, it can't 
be more or less a harmonia than anythin� else. This amounts to 
an extension of the truism 'Everything is what it is', and ap­
plies equally to degrees of harmonia, in the sense just explain• 
ed. Every inter-relation of parts of the soul, at ·whatever remove .. 
from the norm, is an inter-relation of parts. There is, then, 
no general incompatibility between the thesis 'No harmonia is 
more or less a harmonia than any other' and 'Some things are 
more attuned (in Platonic terms 'partake more of harmonia') than 
others'. Plato, however, thinks contradiction arises if one tries 
to say that one harmonia is more attuned than some other: that 
he is wrong even in this restricted thesis will be seen once the 
argument is viewed as a whole. 
The next step (93d6-8) is that something which is neither 
more nor less (of) a harmonia is neither more or less attuned: 
this follows directly by contraposition from bl.l, and may hence 
be called bl.2. Another problematic sentence follows (d9-10): 
'And does that which is neither more nor less attuned partake 
more or less of attunement, or to just the same extent? To the 
same extent.' At first sight it might appear that this is the 
converse of the pr6position stated immediately before (and it 
is so taken by Miss Hicken): But, firstly, in contrast to 
the previous sentence, where the subject is 'that which is 
neither more nor less a harmonia', the predicate of 39-lOis 
'partakes of (i.e. is characterised by) harmonia more or less'. 
One might indeed see here a further confusion of predication 
and identity, but the shift in terminology is presumably intend­
ed to indicate that a new point is being made. Secondly, if 
d9-10 is interpreted as 'Something which is neither more nor 
1 Another sense in which harmoniai admit of degrees is e�em­
plified by temperature, where the inter-relation of hot and 
cdld:!.ma.kes up a continuous scale, but that is irrelevant for 
the purposes of this discussion, since there is no norm of 
heat or cold, and so no sense in which one temperature might 
be thought to be more or less arranged than another� 
10 
less a t t u ned is neither more nor less a harmonia, 'it has no 
subsequent role in the argument, whereas if it is read 'Something 
which is neither more nor less attuned is neither more nor less 
harmonious', we have a straightforward a r g ument of a syllogistic 
form, a s  will be seen below. · 
Socrates next conc lude s (93dl2-e2) that no soul is more or 
less attuned or ar range d than any other, givin� as premisses b2 
and apparently bl.2. But clear l y  some additional premisses are 
require d , viz. the understoodassumption that the soul is a 
harmonia and b2.l, that no harmonia i s  more or less a harmonia 
than any other. In fact the c onc lusi on follows from thesetwo 
together with bl.2, without depending on b2, but since Plato 
regarded b2 and b2.l a s  equivalent he would not h�ve noticed the 
redundancy. From this point on the argument proceeds strai�ht­
forwardly. From b5 and b6 it follows syllogistically that no 
soul is more or les s  harmoniou s  than any other (e4-5) and hence, 
by b3 that no soul is better or worse than any other. It is 
agree d (94al2-b3) that thi s conc lu s ion is absurd, and hence 
one of the premisses from which it is derived must be false; 
obviously, the one to be rejected is the a ssumption that the 
soul i s  a harmonia. 
It appears, therefore that in B we have a single argument 
which is, despite some obscurities c lear in its main lines and 
(perhap s not so c learly ) fallacious. The flaw is not simply in 
the fallacious equivalence of b2 and b2.l, since one might patch 
this up by introducing b2.l as an independent assumption; it 
is perfectly p lausible to suggest that. where ¢ is a predicate 
saying what kind of this its s ub j ect is if A and B are both 
¢s, A can ' t be more ( of) a � than B. A more serious flaw is 
that the kind of harmonia whose presence or ab s ence makes a 
soul good or bad l s not the same kind as that which makes a 
soul to be a soul; the latter is a harmonia of bodily elements, 
vihei•ea s  the fgrmer is a harmonia of parts of the s o ul , or of 
desire s and emotions, or similar p sychical entities. Thus when 
Plato argues that because no soul can be more of a soul-harmonia 
than any other therefore no soul can have more 'virtue'-harmonia 
than any other, he is guilty of a falla c y of equivocation. An 
illus tration should make the point clear. One might reasonably 
say that some piece of music was a harmonia in that it was pro­
duced by strings playing together in certain ratios, and yet that 1 
it lacked harmon i a in that some of the strings were out of tune 
with one another.1 We may thus reject the opinion of most com­
mentator s (most vigorously expressed by Miss Hicken) that to say 
that something which is a harmonia either has or lacks a harmonia 
i s  as absurd as to say that a blow is either vulnerable or invul­
nerable or that a length either has or lacks a length. And in 
rejecting thi s opinion we reject Plato's argument and defend the 
propriety of holding both that that the soul is an entity which 
depend s on some relation of bodily elements and that it itself 
contains parts or faculties which can be better or wor s e  integrat­
e d with one another. Put like thatll these propositions both seem 
reasonable enough, and it is perhaps surpris ing to not ice the 
eagerness with which writers on Plato have insisted that one must 
abandon one or the other. 
11 
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of the Phaedo ) refuted. This difficulty does not seem to have 
occurre dto those who so enthusiastically endorse Socrates' 
arguments here. In fact, the argument3 of the Phaedo are not 
decisive against any version of the harmonia thes is. Their 
main importance lies in making explicit the incompatibility 
of p hysical determinism with a view of the non-physical soul 
as an autonomous agent, but this is far from showing that 
the deterministic thesis is false. 
C. C. W. Taylor 
Oxford University 
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APPENDIX 
The qualities of a harmoni a are determined by those 
of its e lements . P(remiss) 
The activity or passivity of a harmonia is deter­
mined by the activity or passivity of its elements. 
(from al) 
It is impos s ible for a harmonia to control its 
elements. (from al .1) 
It is impos s ible for a harmonia to be affected con­
trary to its elements. (from al.1) 
A h armonia must be as it is attuned. p 
If a harmonia is more or less attuned it is more 
or less a harmonia (from bl) 
92e4-93a2 
a4-5 
all-12 
al4-b2 
No soul is more or les s a soul than any other. p b4-7 
A good soul possesses harmony, a bad so��.dis­
harmony. ···P . 
No harmonia is more or less a h armonia than any 
other. (from b2 by equivalence: invalid) 
Something which is neither more nor less a h armonia 
is anither more nor less attuned. 
(from bl.l by contraposition) 
(The soul is a harmonia). 
Something which is neither more nor less attuned 
possesses neither more nor less harmony. P 
No soul is more or less attuned than any other. 
(bl.2, b2 . l , b4) 
No soul possesses m ore or less harmony than any 
other. (b5, b6) 
No s oul is be tt e r or worse thany any other. (b3, b6) 
The soul �s hbt a harmonia. 
(from b4, b8 by reductio ad absurdum') 
The soul controls and opposes bodily inclinations.P 
Re-statement of al.11 and al.12. 
The soul is not a harmonia. 
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